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Although the phenomenon is more pronounced to those of us who 
live in Scotland, it is apparent to any British sociologist that so-
ciological statements about and empirical materials illustrating the 
'British social structure' are firmly grounded on studies of England. 
There are no texts which provide the basic picture of the Scottish 
social structure on which a good analysis can be based. {l) Sometimes 
absence is accounted for by the assumption that the British social 
structure is homogeneous, or by an admission that 'Scotland is diff-
erent', but pleading ignorance of the form and dimensions of its social 
structure. 
Over the last few years, assumptions about the social, economic 
and political homogeneity of British society have begun to be question-
ed. Regional disparities have not disappeared in the post-war period 
and have shown up in prolonged recession since the mid 1960s, the pro-
blems of declining industries, and attempts by the State at industrial 
and physical regeneration have reinforced this breakdown while politi-
cal differences have become more marked. 
The old assumption was built partly on the view that the British 
state and British society were neatly related, that because Britain 
was governed by a unified and centralised system of government, the 
social structure would reflect this homogeneity. Only now are sociolo-
gists beginning to be interested in 'regional' variations. These varia-
tions are, of course, geographical, but they are more than that. Space 
* I am grateful to my colleagues, Frank Bechhofer and Steve Kendrick , 
with whom I have discussed many of the ideas in this paper. Together 
we have begun to gather sociographic material on Scotland in a study 
financed by the Social Science Research Council (HR 6948/1). 
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comes both to pattern and to reflect important differences in econom11
and social development within Britain. In this 
vides a strategically interesting case 
ture is overlaid by important political and cultural levels - part 
a 'civil society' which has managed to survive more than 200 years 
political union with different legal and cultural institutions. One 
of the most obvious manifestations is the resurgence of nationalism 
political and cultural - in the past fifteen years. 
The argument about the 'distinctiveness• of Scotland can become 
a sterile one, subservient to the political requirements of national-
ists and unionists alike. Nevertheless, processes of economic, 
and political change have had a particular impact on Scotland. 
(a) Economic Change 
While the Act of Uhion can be seen as some kind of recognition 
a close relation between the ·Scottish economy and that of 
a whole, the relationship has been particularly close for the 
years or so. At the turn of the century, the Scottish economy 
highly developed but also highly specialised part of 
dependent on heavy industry and coarse textiles, and 
come still more integrated into the British economy. 
blem of industrial regeneration has faced successive governments 
the 1950s, and they have been forced to intervene earlier and 
much greater extent than south of the border. This revolution 
land's economy has had fundamental effects. The industrial elite who 
depended for their social and political as well as economic power on 
the success of their 'junior partner' role in Victorian imperial dev-
elopment, found their power and influence drastically reduced. Second,
the State direction of industry has advanced, and the power of entre-
preneurs has diminished. Third, there has been a consequent change in 
the location of ownership and control of the industrial base. The Sco-.
ttish economy has become a 'branch' or a 'satellite' economy. 
(b) Political and Social Change 
Partly because of the stage at which Scotland, and Britain gen-
erally, developed, economic development was not accompanied by nation-
al mobilisation;(
3
) nationalism was not harnessed in the course of 
economic development in Scotland, and the political aspirations of the 
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scottish industrial bourgeoisie did not take the form of nationalist 
demands. It is only in recent years that a degree of 'politicisation' 
of civil society has occurred, partly reflected in the upsurge of nat-
ionalism. The relationship between the British state and •scottish so-
ciety' has become more problematic as the state has been involved more 
and more with the problems of the Scottish economy, coinciding with 
the hopes and aspirations boosted by North Sea Oil. The rapid rise of 
the Nationalist party in the political stakes should not be allowed 
to mask the growing divergence of political behaviour between Scotland 
and England since the 1950s. 
These important differences in social, economic and political de-
velopment in Scotland are clearly going to be reflected in the social 
structure, but as yet we have little by way of good sociological an-
alysis of Scotland. It is impossible to cover all aspects of the so-
cial structure in one short essay. The focus will be on those elements 
which determine the shape of distribution of social and economic pow-
er in society - the industrial and occupational structure, and patterns 
of social inequality. These aspects of the social structure form the 
web of social constraint which are imposed within the society itself, 
and which, although people directly experience, they are often only 
dimly aware of. 
Industrial and Occupational Change in Scotland 
For too long, we have covered our ignorance about social change 
in Scotland with easy assumptions, for example, that changes in Scot-
land's industrial base have led to Scotland becoming 'de-skilled' or 
'proletarianised'. (
4
) The reality is more prosaic. The most up to date 
information available shows that the 'service' sector is by far the 
major industrial category in terms of employment, and that it is the 
only sector to have increased in size over the past ten years (by 
167,000 jobs). 
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These data refer to both men and women in the labour market, and 
fleet the growing importance of women in employment. Women now accoun1
for some 40% of the labour force,(
5
) and, taking the rough with the 
smooth, some 37% of the unemployed in Scotland. However, the labour 
market for women is significantly different from that of men; 
1976 data, we find that 37% of men were employed in manufacturing, 
compared with 22% of women. Women are more likely to be 
fessional and scientific services (28%; 9% of men) and in distribu-
tion (17%; 7% of men). 
From the above table, it is clear that manufacturing industry, 
in the rest of Britain, represents a declining proportion of the 
bour force. Although Scotland shares this trend with the rest of 
tain, there are some important differences in its industrial and 
pational structures. Analysing data for male workers only,( 6 ) it 
clear that, using S.I.C. Industrial Orders as before, certain 
of Scottish industry are more important employers than south of the 
border. (
7
) Deriving an index figure of 100 if the same proportion of 
workers in Scotland as in England and Wales are employed in the sec-
tor, it becomes clear that Scotland still (in 1971) has a dispropor-
tionate number employed in shipbuilding and engineering (298), agri-
culture, forestry and fishing (174), food, drink and tobacco (154), 
textiles (122) and construction (120). Similarly, certain sectors 
employ far less workers in Scotland than in England and Wales; coal 
and petroleum products (47), clothing and footwear (42), vehicles (52) 
metal goods (52), electrical engineering (62), insurance, banking, 
finance and business services (72) and chemicals (75). 
Examination of the occupational structure (for male workers only) 
begins to reveal the outlines of Scotland's social structure: 
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occupational Structure (1971): Males in Employment 
Scotland Scotland x 100 
England & Wales 
socio-economic 2roup (S.E.G.) 
% 
1. Employers and managers 
large establishments 3.7 94 
z. Employers and managers 
small establishments 6.4 79 
3. Professionals: self-employed 1.0 106 
4. Professionals: employees 3.9 90 
5. Intermediate non-manual 5.3 91 
6. Junior non-manual 11.3 92 
7. Personal service workers 1.0 104 
8. Foremen and supervisors: manual 3.6 99 
9. Skilled manual 33.0 109 
10. Semi-skilled manual 12.8 100 
11. Unskilled manual 8.7 125 
12. OWn account workers 2.5 53 
13. Farmers - employers and managers 1.1 147 
14. Farmers - own account 1.1 128 
15. Agricultural workers 2.7 192 
16. Armed forces 1.5 95 
Others (not classified) .4 
---
100.0 
Thus Scotland on the whole tends to have fewer men employed in non-
manual than in nianual work. There are fewer 'own account' workers, 
but a disproportionate number of farmers, large and small. There is 
a smaller proportion in S.E.G. 1 and 2, employers and managers in 
public and private concerns, but a disproportionate number of self-
employed professionals - lawyers and accountants. It is the case that 
a disproportionate number of Scots are manual workers, although the 
unskilled category shows the highest differential from England and 
Wales. 
It cannot simply be concluded, however, that the different in-
dustrial distribution of the labour force in Scotland can fully account 
for the peculiarities of the socio-economic structure compared to that 
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of England and Wales. In order to answer that question, Jones( 8 ) has 
used shift-share analysis to apportion the extent of 
socio-economic structure to the industrial structure or the occupa-
tional structure. Using this technique he is able to conclude: 
"For men, at least, it appears that Scotland's 
relative excess of 'undesirable' jobs has been, 
in the recent past, due as much to the internal 
structure of her industries as to the industrial 
distribution of the labour force." (P.405) 
However, the problems of inferring further from this data are 
considerable. We cannot simply assume that the S.E.G. figures 
by the registrar-general are indicators of 
registrar-general's categories contain sub-groups from different 
classes, making the construction of 'social class' very difficult. 
Using these the two most 
the S.E.G. categories to give some indication of processes in the 
io-economic structures of Scotland compared with England and Wales. 
'Upper non-manual' 
(SEGs 1,2,3,4,12 & 13) 
'Lower non-manual' 
(SEGs 5,6,7 & 8) 
'Manual' 
(SEGs 9,10 & 11) 
In all parts of Britain, 





















the trends towards non-manual occupations 
in evidence, although Scotland starts 
larger manual category. Nowhere is there much evidence of a diverqenc~
occurring between the industrial and occupational structures of 
parts of Britain. 
.Manufacturing Industry 
In recent years, commentators have been pointing to the shr 
of Britain's manufacturing sector and its declining profitability. ( 9 ) 
In this respect, Scotland's manufacturing industry fits this unenv 
pattern. Although the U.K. and Scotland appear to be doing no worse 
than other countries in terms of percentage employed in manufacture, 
the trend since 1963 shows that only in the U.K. and the Netherlands 
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has there been an absolute loss of manufacturing jobs. (lO) In Scot-
land, the heavy erosion of jobs in manufacturing has been moving at 
around 5,800 annually between 1963 and 1974. The loss of jobs in Scot-
land has been large in agriculture as Firn shows, as well as in metal 
manufacture and textiles. 
This decline in manufacturing industry in Scotland would probably 
have been much worse but for the growing importance of non-Scottish 
owned industry coming into Britain since 1945. The loss of indigeneous 
manufacturing industry in Scotland has been partially compensated for 
by the advent of non-local firms, most significantly, North Ameri-
can. 
(11) 
According to John Firn, in 1973, 59% of employment in manufactur-
ing industry in Scotland was controlled 'externally' (including English 
control). Firn 1 s work, (l
2
) using the 1973 data-base on manufacturing 
industry in Scotland constructed by the Scottish Council (Development 
and Industry), provided the first systematic and reliable profile of 
the changes taking place in Scottish manufacturing industry. Where-
as nearly 72% of plants were 'Scottish', compared with 21% of English 
and 5% North American, the Scottish firms employed only 41% of employ-
ees in manufacturing, compared with 40% by English, and 15% by North 
American concerns. The larger the enterprise, the more likely it is 
to be externally owned, for whereas 86% of plants employing 50 people 
or less are Scottish, only 25% of those employing more than 1,000 are 
Scottish-owned. Of the top 110 plants, providing nearly half of manu-
facturing employment in Scotland, only one-quarter are Scottish owned. 
Firn concluded: 
"The faster the growth of the sector, the higher 
the proportion of that sector's employment in 
Scotland that is externally-controlled. The 
level of Scottish control in the five fastest-
growing sectors is only some 13.5% of total 
employment in these sectors in Scotland." (P.l61) 
Recent updating by Campbell(l
3
) using 1977 data revealed a further in-
tensification of external control in manufacturing industry. 
More recent work by the Scottish Economic Planning Department(l4 ) 
using 1979 data shows that 275 overseas units, European and American, 
provide some 100,000 jobs in Scottish manufacturing industry, 16% of 
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employment in this sector. Or course, Scotland is by no means the 
part or Britain dependent on foreign investment; in 
U.K. manufacturing employment was provided by overseas firms. What 
significant about foreign investment in Scotland is that it is dis-
proportionately from the United States, whose corporations provide 
some 72,000 or the 100,000 jobs in manufacturing. More recently, 
has been a trend towards European investment in Scotland. 
Certainly since Firn carried out his analysis in 1973, the 
vestment by foreign companies has continued, although there has 
a slackening orr in U.S. involvement. However, in recent years, 
ployment growth has ceased and there has occurred a net loss or 
ound 8,000 jobs, especially in mechanical engineering. Since 1975, 
there has been a 4% drop in total employment in Scottish manufactur-
ing, but over the same period, a fall or 7% in employment in oversea~
owned plants. 
A recent report by Hood and Young for the Scottish Orrice(lS) 
to U.S. owned manufacturing companies in Scotland was more sanguine 
about their influence. They pointed out that there was 
imbalance between the American Scottish affiliates and the U.S. 
ent company, and that a number or the smaller corporations in 
had done better than some or the major U.S. corporations at home. 
Nevertheless, such a financial performance does not necessarily 
tradict the fact that in 1979, a significant number or 'branch' 
belonging to U.S. corporations have either closed or shed labour, 
most notable being Singer (3,000 jobs), but also Goodyear, Hoover, 
Monsanto and Timex. In all, some 28,000 
1979. 
The work done by Firn and others into foreign investment in 
ish manufacturing industry is not only or economic but also 
significance. We need to know more about the effects on the socio-
economic structure or Scotland or these phenomena. We have not yet 
been able, for example, to link industrial employment with changes 
the occupational structure, work which can only be done when the 1981
census data becomes available. The effects or overseas investment and
or the impact or the oil industry will only be in evidence when we 
are able to compare 1971 and 1981 data on the occupational 
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At present we can only surmise that external control has had some 
impact on the employment structure or Scotland, but we cannot know 
whether it serves to increase the levels or skill in Scotland by pro-
viding employment opportunities for skilled labour, or whether such 
employment merely provides for •screwdriver' or assembly jobs requir-
ing lower levels or skill. 
Some important sociological issues also present themselves for 
resolution. To what extent does dependence on foreign capital remove 
political as well as economic decision-making from within Scotland? 
Even although the level or political decision-making occurring within 
Scotland is minimal already, what is the effect on governmental and 
political structures or such dependence? At present, we have little 
inkling as to what this dependence means for Scotland. However, recent 
research on the impact or the North Sea Oil industry on North East 
Scotland, (l
6
) and particularly on Aberdeen, suggests that the in-
trusion or non-local enterprises into what has been traditionally a 
self-contained economy has had dramatic consequences for the distri-
bution or social and political power. The shirt in the level or con-
trol on the economic base, together with greater central state in-
volvement 1 in the national interest• has removed the social and econo-
mic hegemony or local capital, and redefined the power game in the 
North East. 
The value or Firnts work cannot be denied for he had done much 
or the valuable spade-work for the student or socio-economic change 
in Scotland. However, he admits that defining the location or ulti-
mate control in geographical terms is but the first step in the ana-
lysis or ownership and control. Similarly, it would be inappropriate 
to construct such an analysis simply on the basis or manufacturing 
industry, a declining employer or labour in Scotland. 
John Scott and Michael Hughes(l7 ) have set out to provide for a 
more sociological analysis or economic power in Scotland, rather than 
a 'geography' or ultimate ownership. Confining their analysis to the 
96 companies who own the 114 largest plants in Scotland , they dis-
covered that 26 or them are 'Scottish' in Firn's terms, 48 are 
'English' and 21 'North American'. Or the 'Scottish' companies, 17 
are public companies, such as DCL, Aberdeen Construction, Carron, 
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Coats Paton, United Biscuits and Weir. In no case is there evidence 
of 'managerial' control of the company, though minority shareholder 
control is the norm. Further work on the interests of the directors 
(156 in all) of these 17 companies reveals that in 
their primary interests are in Scotland; only 24% of these dir~ctnTQ
have business interests outwith Scotland. 
It is clear in their earlier work that Scott and Hughes 
happy with a crude 'interest-counting' by way of assessing ' 
in the major companies of Scotland. In subsequent 
ploy the analysis of Maurice Zeitlin(lB) to argue 
be a separation o£ the managerial £unction from ownership., there is 
not necessarily a separation o£ control £rom such ownership. A par 
cularly important role is played by banks and investment 
controlling the network o£ Scottish companies: 
"The top Scottish companies appear to form a 
highly integrated network o£ financial companies 
with a number o£ tentacles reaching out in industry. 
The Scottish-registered sector o£ the economy is a 
proprietary controlled system of highly integrated 
financial and industrial interests.n(19) 
Given the controlling interests of English banks in the major 
ones, (
2
0) Scottish industry is more integrated into the 
mic and financial structure than ever before. 
However, although Scottish capital is predominantly owned by 
English interests, the network o£ interlocking directorships shows 
the relative autonomy o£ Scottish business within the British econo-
{21) my. 
"The Scottish network is a relatively autonomous 
sub-system of an over-arching British system. 
English interests in Scottish companies are 
mediated through a distinct Scottish directorate." (P.42) 
Scottish companies, Scott and Hughes conclude, are directed by "a 
corps o£ Scotsmen". 
What, then, are we to conclude about changes in Scotland's 
trial and occupational structures? The major feature o£ 
over the last fifty years or so has been the opening up 
ish economy to non-Scottish influences. The loss of power by an 
enous capitalist class with the decline of traditional manufacturing 
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industry has opened up opportunities £or the State to play a more im-
portant role in economic decision making and new forms of capital to 
penetrate the economy and socio-economic structure. The importance o£ 
foreign capital, North American and European, shows little signs o£ 
abating and has become an integral part o£ the economy. The shift of 
control within Britain has resulted £rom amalgamations and takeovers 
of key Scottish firms (e.g. House o£ Fraser), and from the centrali-
sation o£ nationalised industry in steel and in shipbuilding. Increas-
ingly, financial and commercial capital has taken a controlling in-
terest in that part o£ manufacturing industry which remains indigeneous 
and in profitable new outlets such as the oil industry. Nevertheless, 
the top Scottish companies remain in the managerial hands o£ the 'corps 
of Scotsmen', who are able to apply their knowledge of local political, 
social and economic structures. In the management and control of its 
economy, Scotland no longer provides its own entrepreneurs, but contri-
butes a 'managerial class' well versed in local conditions. 
Social Ineguality 
An understanding o£ the social structure requires that we examine 
the distribution o£ social and economic benefits, £or this will re-
flect the configurations o£ power in Scotland. Sorting out reality £rom 
myth is particularly important because o£ the accretions o£ conven-
tional wisdom which have gathered around the topic o£ social inequal-
ity. 
The statement that Scotland is a 'more equal' society has often 
been asserted, but rarely tested. It is true that there appear to be 
some a priori reasons £or arguing this. First, the relative importance 
of the State in determining rewards and life chances in Scotland might 
be expected to have diminished the extent of social inequality. Second, 
shared aspects o£ social and cultural status, such as accent and life-
style, rather than economic class might create such an impression. 
Third, there persists what Alan McLaren(
22
) has called 'the democratic 
myth' - that Scotland offers greater equality o£ social opportunity 
£or self advancement - generated by democratic Presbyterianism with 
its emphasis on education. 
However, in attributing to Scotland and its Kirk a commitment to 
4g 
democracy and equality of opportunity, it is important to bear in 
mind that its notion of 'equality' was a narrow one, as McLaren( 23 ) 
has pointed out: 
"··' the belief in a specific Scottish egalitarianism 
never implied that Scotland was in any sense a classless 
society. It held that the social gap between classes 
was never important, and through societal encouragement 
and institutional means the 'lad or pairtst with ability 
and resolution could easily effect a crossing." 
What was on offer was equality of opportunity, not equality of 
ment. 
(a) Equality and Educational Opportunity 
Research at the Centre for Educational Sociology at the Univer-
sity of Edinburgh has shed light on the workings of the Scottish edu-
cation system, particularly on the cosy assumptions which Scots have 
been apt to wrap themselves in on the matter of educational 
ity. By taking the entrants of Scottish universities at two time-
points 1962 and 1972, Hutchison and McPherson( 24 ) have been able 
compare the entrance rates by sex and social class for these two 
Their data shows unequivocally that the proportion of students from 
manual backgrounds actually fell from 35.4% in 1962 to 
Such findings that working class children do not go to 
to be found in much research in England and Wales; most recently, 
Halsey and his colleagues, (
25
) looking at the social composition of 
all students, not only first year entrants, put the proportion of 
students from manual backgrounds at 19.7%. 
By and large, the expansion of universities in the mid 1960s 
nefited middle class women to the detriment of working class men, 




















There is no doubting that equality of educational opportunity, parti-
cularly as it relates to social class, has not been achieved. To un-
derstand the mechanisms of inequality would require a more extensive 
examination of primary and secondary education as well as the role of 
fee-paying schools, particularly in Edinburgh and Glasgow, which op-
erate to cream off a significant number of middle class children, and 
thus serve to perpetuate educational and social divisions. 
(b) Eguality and Social Opportunity 
Until recently, our knowledge about social mobility in Scotland 
belonged to realms of surmise, assertion and conjecture for there was 
no data available to show us how much (or how little) mobility was ta-
king place across the occupational structure. The recent mobility stu-
dies - in Scotland at the University of Aberdeen, ( 26 ) and in England 
. {27) . . 
and Wales at Nuff1eld College, Oxford - have g1ven us the means 
to make a more reasoned and grounded assessment as to the 'openness' 
of our occupational structure. 
Perhaps the most striking finding of both studies is the high de-
gree of self-recruitment into manual occupations across the genera-
tions. Nearly three quarters of manual workers, skilled as well as un-
skilled, had fathers who were also manual workers. A high degree of 
self-recruitment is also in evidence among 'small proprietors' - a 
category including shop-keepers, small farmers and those who own small 
businesses. 32% of small proprietors had fathers in the same occupa-
tion; and 47.5% of fathers who were small proprietors had sons in 
the same category, a figure higher even than for manual workers. 
It comes as little surprise to discover high self-recruitment of 
the top group - major employers, professionals and managers. 42% of 
fathers in group I have sons in the same group, and a further 22% end 
up in the lower professional, managerial and employer category (group 
II). Only 11% end up as manual workers. Certainly there is a degree 
of openness at the top, a leavening of the elite, but the phenomenon 
should be interpreted with care. First, it is obvious that over the 
generation in question, the ~ of jobs in group I has increased 
dramatically, with the expansion in professionals and administrative 
jobs in particular. Consequently, there is room enough at the top to 
accommodate both the sons of the older elite, and to provide opportuni-
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ties ror the upwardly mobile, especially through the education system.
So there is little evidence or downward mobility among the sons or 
'professionals'; most stay at the top or the tree. Upward social mo-
bility over the last thirty years has resulted from an 
bour market for non-manual workers and from the demand 
als and administrators in a bureaucratised society. 
(c) Equality and The Distribution or Economic and Social Benefits 
Scotland has always been a relatively poor country. On most ec-
onomic indicators - personal disposable income, consumers' expendi-
ture- its population has lagged behind that or England. Nevertheless,
one or the startling features or relative economic performance has 
been the declining differential in earnings between Scottish and Eng-
lish workers. 
Average weekly earnings of adult male ma.nual employ ... : Scotland u a per cent of GB/UK 
S I Aftril fill•..., S:.:a .. nt ....... c ~urv-
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Scottish Economic Bulletin~' Spring 1980, p.28 
A recent sxudy by the Scottish Economic Planning Department( 28 ) into 
these trends argued that while Scots work more overtime (thereby in-
flating 'earnings'), there had been major growths in labour producti-
vity in Scotland compared with the U.K. 
Alongside these shirts in income have gone a narrowing 
economic and social differentials. Whereas in the mid 1960s, the 
ish rate or unemployment was over 150% or the U.K. rate, by the 
1970s and later it had fallen to under 120%. (Z
9
} That barometer 
c1al and economic malaise, the migration rate, had fallen from 43,000 
in 1965 to 14,500 in 1979. ( 30} 
Although we have data on Scotland/Great Britain earnings com-
parison, we can say nothing about the distribution or income within 
Scotland. The Royal Commission on the Distribution or Income 
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has not provided intra-U.K. comparisons in the way it has done so ror 
the distribution or personal wealth. (
31
) These data were collected 
ror 1973 and up-dated for 1975, and they show that wealth is more un-
equally distributed in Scotland compared with England and Wales: 


























Further research has also been carried out by Alan Harrison( 3 Z} 
ror the Fraser or Allander Institute for the period between 1938 and 
1969, and both sets or data seem to indicate a more unequal distri-
bution regarding the ownership or wealth, but we have to be careful in 
our interpretation or these data for there are methodological pitralls.(33) 
To a large extent however, these data are a reflection or the own-
ership or certain kinds or assets. John McEwen( 34 ) has shown that the 
ownership or landed estates has changed little since the 1874 census 
or land. Another factor leading to inequality or wealth is the extent 
or public sector housing in Scotland. Housing is not only an important 
feature in this respect, it also plays a central role in the processes 
generating poverty and deprivation. 
In 1975, the Department or the Environment produced a report( 35 ) 
studying the concentration or deprivation. By ranking the 'worst' cen-
sus enumeration districts (E.D.s} in Great Britain on one or more in-
dicators (thus giving a measure or 'multiple' deprivation), the re-
searchers concluded: 
"Clydeside consistently has a very much more than 
proportionate share or the worst 5% or E.D.s on 
nearly all kinds or deprivation, and so to a 
36 lesser extent does the rest or 'urban' Scotland."( ) 
So, Scotland contained as much as 72% or the worst 5% E.D.s in 
Britain when overcrowding and male unemployment were used together as 
a measure or deprivation. Proportionately, it should have had only 








Glasgow, but in Edinburgh, Dundee, Aberdeen, Clydebank, Paisley and 
Rutherglen. We cannot say from these data how many of the households 
in these E.D.s which have high levels of deprivation are themselves 
deprived. We require rather different forms of research on mu~tiple 
deprivation focusing on people rather than places before we can answer 
this question. However, some research has begun to be done, and Geoff 
Norris's pamphlet for the Child Poverty Action Group provides a useful 
review using more conventional measures of poverty. (
37
) 
A more detailed reading of the Department of Environment report 
reveals that urban poverty is changing its locale. Whereas once the 
'traditional' areas of poverty were inner city slum areas containing 
very amenity deficient housing, to a great extent urban deprivation 
has become the property of council-built urban ghettoes on the fringes 
of our towns and cities. 
Why should this be so? Why, after two generations of council 
housing, should the promise of a fairer and better life have been be-
trayed? As yet, the social and political mechanisms of such concentra-
tion of deprivation are poorly understood, but there seems little do-
ubt that they derive from the development and practice of public hous-
ing policies in Scotland. Sean Damer(
3
S) has shown how local authori-
ties have created social divisions within council housing by building 
different housing for different groups of people, high amenity housing
for 'general purposes' and low amenity housing for 'slum clearance•. 
The consequences of fifty years of such policies are quite visible -
in the 'Wine Alleys', the Ferguslie Parks, the Bowhouses, Piltons and 
Fintrys of Scottish towns and cities. 
Further, the peculiarities of the land tenure system together 
with the constellations of land and property interests which had so 
much to do with the making of Scottish cities seem to have produced a 
pattern of stark social segregation. (
39
) In contemporary terms, for 
example, Edinburgh{40) is the most socially segregated city, more di-
vided than British or American cities yet studied. The argument must 
be that in order to understand urban deprivation, we must understand 
processes of social segregation. We cannot comprehend the concentra-
tion of the poor without accounting for the segregation of the rich, 
each is the outcome of political and economic policies at the local 
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and the national level. Despite the salience of housing as the politi-
cal issue,{ 4 l) it seems that State intervention has simply provided a 
new and more efficient form of social regulation. There is little evi-
dence that greater State involvement has been significantly redistri-
butive. By drawing upon what Geoffrey Best{
4
Z) has called 'civil auth-
oritarianism' in Scottish cities, the State has taken on the role of 
moral regulator and social policeman. The worst forms of poverty and 
social inequality may have been reduced, but there is little sign of 
their eradication from the Scottish social structure. 
Conclusion: Power and Authority in Scotland 
Perhaps more than most other parts of Britain, Scotland has under-
gone a shift from a self-regulating and self-legitimating 'economic' 
system to a more consciously regulated 'political' one. The problem 
of industrial decline in Scotland in the last fifty years has forced 
the State to play a more active role in seeking economic solutions, 
thereby, becoming more embroiled in the social fabric. In many ways, 
the 'corporate society' is alive and well in Scotland, and has been 
since Tom Johnston added to Scottish Office powers with Churchill's 
connivance. ( 43 ) It is, though, a peculiar corporate society, for the 
politicians play an odd role. The absence of devolved democratic power 
means that only a few government ministers play a significant role in 
its exercise, given the dislocation between electoral strength and po-
litical authority. 
The power of bureaucratic authority in Scotland is very signifi-
cant, and yet our understanding of it is poor. The existence of a 
'non-democratic elite', to use John P. Mackintosh's term, has spawned 
a myriad of so-called quangoes and semi-public authorities, and an 
analysis is needed of the recruitment patterns and network of influence 
in these bodies. Given the scale of Scottish society, perhaps social 
and personal connections are more significant, and networks of in-
fluence might be traced across different aspects of Scottish life -
politics, business, the universities, the church and the professions.<
44
) 
The social structure of Scotland is undergoing fundamental change. 
The extension of the activities of the State, significant shifts in the 




new social and political movements all present an intellectual chall-









It can be argued, of course, that 'Scotland' as a unit of 
analysis is somewhat problematic, as there are significant 
regional variations within it (as in Britain). However, in-
sofar as 'Scotland' has a political-administrative as well 
as socio-cultural meaning, there is justification for using 
it. 
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